The land of black gold, corruption, poverty and sabotage: overcoming the Niger Delta’s problems through the establishment of a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund (NNRSF). by Gonzalez, Adrian
1 
 
 
 This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted following peer review for 
publication in Cogent Social Sciences 
The land of black gold, corruption, poverty and sabotage: overcoming the Niger Delta’s 
problems through the establishment of a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund 
(NNRSF) 
Adrian Gonzalez, Cardiff University 
Through statistics published by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), the 
paper explores why oilfield sabotage from 2009 to 2015 remains a problem in the Niger 
Delta, despite the 2009 amnesty programme. It explains why some of these incidents are a 
direct result of the failure to implement socio-economic development in successive state 
agencies due to corruption, a consequence of the natural resource curse. The article then 
explores why and how a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund (NNRSF) overseen 
by the United Nations Development Programme should be established which would not only 
manage a portion of oil revenue funds from the Niger Delta but also initiate valid social and 
economic projects in order to help reduce the prevalence of sabotage and instability in the 
region. 
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1. Introduction: Nigeria and the resource curse  
An investigation into this West African state reveals a country teeming with financial, 
social and economic contradictions. Despite Nigeria's huge petroleum resource wealth, it is 
clear that the country has been unable to utilise this for the benefit of wider society as a range 
of international statistics on life expectancy (United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP], 2014, p. 162)1, poverty (Department for International Development [DFID], 2012a, 
p. 1, 2012b p. 2; United Nations Children’s Funds, n.d.), child mortality (DFID, 2012a, 2012b, 
p. 1), unemployment (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012, p. 87; Trading Economics, 
n.d.), malaria (DFID, 2012b, p. 2) and sanitation levels testify (The World Bank, n.d.).  
 
A central question this paper sets out to explain is how this poor socio-economic 
situation has occurred in a nation so rich in natural resources. One could argue that Nigeria’s 
over reliance on oil revenue (Ahmed, 1985, p. 347; IMF, 2013, p. 28; Nwajiaku, 2005, p. 464; 
 
1 One must acknowledge that whilst the 2013 UNDP life expectancy figure of 52.5 years (UNDP, 2014, p. 162) 
shows a slight improvement on the 2011 figure of 51.9 years (UNDP, 2011, p. 129), this still helps to place Nigeria 
in the low human development index (HDI) category (a ranking of 152 out of 187 nations) (UNDP, 2014, p. 162) 
and beneath many other sub-Saharan African nations. 
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Pinto, 1989, p. 331; Ross, 2003, p. 9), economic mismanagement (Forrest, 1986, p. 12; Uche 
& Uche, 2004) and lack of trade and industrial diversity (Akindele, 1986, p. 9; Cooper, 1992, 
p. 35; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003, p. 13)2 has left the country badly affected by world 
oil price shocks. This is a difficult foundation from which to achieve socio-economic 
development. Indeed, at least half of the members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) (including Nigeria, a member since 1971) were poorer in 2005 than they 
had been in the 1970s (Higgins, 2009, p. 3; Ross, 2008, p. 3).  
 
Nevertheless, despite recent production problems3 and a slump in the 2015 global oil 
prices (see EIA, n.d.), the country has received a large fiscal revenue from oil throughout the 
previous three decades (see OPEC, 2008, p. 13, 2015, p. 17) (helping it to amass over $600 
billion in oil revenue since the start of production in the 1960s) (Amnesty International & 
Friends of the Earth International, 2011, p. 4) which can conceivably minimise global market 
oil price fluctuations as a cause of its societal poverty and weak national development. Instead, 
it is clear that Nigeria suffers from the natural resource curse, a phenomenon that at its broadest 
level sees resource-rich countries grow less economically rapidly than resource-scare 
economies (Bulte & Damania, 2008; Collier & Hoeffler, 2009; Dietz, Neumayer, & De Soysa, 
2007; Norrbin, Pipatchaipoom, & Bors, 2008; Pendergast, Clarke, & Van Kooten, 2011; Ploeg, 
2011; Sachs & Warner, 1997; Wick & Bulte, 2005). This resource curse has two generalised 
impacts both of which are visible in Nigeria. 
 
Firstly, studies have indicated that resource-rich and resource-dependent countries are 
more likely to lapse into violence (Elbadawi & Soto, 2015; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2004, 
2006) and instability. It is clear that Nigeria, a country that fits both these preconditions, has 
 
2 It must be noted here that although oil exports have developed rapidly since the 1960s, agriculture (including 
livestock, forestry and fishing) still produces about 40% of GDP (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, p. 33). 
Be that as it may, agricultural productivity remains poor partly due to limited access to pesticides, extension 
services and modern technology (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, p. 33). The economy outside of the 
energy sector is also seen as highly inefficient and is estimated to be as high as 75% of the total economy (Odularu, 
2007, pp. 2, 4). The northern agricultural base has also suffered from pastoralist-farmer clashes in Bauchi, Jigawa 
and Yobe States during the 1980s and 1990s due to cattle overgrazing and a lack of grazing resources in 
floodplains (Adams and Mortimore, 1997, p. 154; Milligan and Binns, 2007, pp. 145-146) so Nigeria is heavily 
reliant on its mineral extraction income.   
3 Production reached a peak of 2.44 million bbl/d (barrels per day) in 2005 but began to decline significantly due 
to militant group violence which forced many companies to withdraw and production to plummet by 25% by 2009 
(averaging only 1.8 million bbl/d) (EIA, 2013, p. 7). Figures for 2014 averaged only 1.90 million bbl/d (first 
quarter) (Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 2014a, p. 26), 1.91 million bbl/d (second quarter) (CBN, 2014b, p. 26), 
1.98 million bbl/d (third quarter) (CBN, 2014c, p. 26), 1.99 million bbl/d (fourth quarter) (CBN, 2014d, p. 26) 
and in 2015 1.89 million bbl/d (first quarter) (CBN, 2015, p. 26), the latter a decline of 4.1% in comparison to the 
last quarter of 2014. 
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been prone to violence in the oil-producing region of the Niger Delta since the 1970s (Eweje, 
2006a, p. 30; Frynas, 2000; Hazen & Horner, 2007; Ikein, Alamieyeseigha, & Azaiki, 2008, p. 
172; Maehler, 2010; Obi, 2001; Olusakin, 2006; Omeje, 2006a; Watts, 2007; Zalik, 2004, p. 
406). This has disrupted oil production and caused adverse financial consequences for the 
country (Amadi, Germiso, & Henriksen, 2006, p. 25; Cesarz, Morrison, & Cooke, 2003, p. 1; 
Watts, 2007, p. 639). The sabotage/theft of oil facilities through artisanal refining and 
bunkering has played an instrumental role in this instability (see Davis, Von Kemedi, & 
Drennan, 2006, p. 5; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2011a, pp. 101–102) 
and its scale and impact are significant; around 7–10% of Nigeria’s oil production is bunkered 
(Mazzitelli, 2007, p. 1083) which has had a recent monthly estimated value of $1 billion (Obi, 
2014, pp. 259–260).  
 
Secondly, the resource curse can disrupt national governance through increased state 
and societal corruption (Arezki & Brückner, 2011; Bulte & Damania, 2008; Busse & Gronning, 
2011; Dietz et al., 2007; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Mehlum, Moene, 
& Torvik, 2006; Robbins, 2000; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003; Shaxson, 2007; Weinthal 
& Luong, 2006, p. 38), particularly in countries with weak or poor state institutions like Nigeria 
(Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 225–226; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, n.d.; Omeje, 2006b, p. 213; The 
World Bank, 2015, pp. 4–6) and this has major significance in explaining the country’s present 
socio-economic issues. “[H]igh natural resource rent relative to GDP …. deflects the incentives 
of governments away from the efficient creation of wealth and into rent re-distribution, which 
confers greater and more immediate political rewards” (Auty, 2007, p. 629).  
 
Evidence of corruption in post-independency Nigeria exists via international statistics 
(The World Bank, 2015, p. 7) and academic literature (Bain, Porter, & Watts, 2015; Diamond, 
1983, p. 906; Dike, 2005; Fagbadebo, 2007, p. 30; Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 223–224, 244; 
Omololu, 2007; Scher, 2005, p. 20; Smith, 2001, 2007; Tignor, 1993). For example, 
Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perception Index data ranked Nigeria 
136th out of the 176 countries, categorising it as highly corrupt (Transparency International, 
2014), a conclusion also shared by Human Rights Watch (HRW) who named their 2007 
Nigerian report Criminal Politics owing to the pervasiveness of violence and corruption within 
the country’s governmental institutions (HRW, 2007). The scale of this problem is colossal. 
According to the country’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFFC), the level of 
public funding embezzled since Nigerian independence is estimated to be between $380 billion 
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and $412 billion (Ayittey, 2006, p. 5; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009, p. 214), the latter figure being 
equivalent to six Marshall Plans (Ayittey, 2006, p. 4). Within the petroleum industry, the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) has suffered decades of inefficiency and 
corruption that recently saw $20 billion worth of oil revenue “lost” in 2014 (Sayne, Gillies, & 
Katsouris, 2015).  
 
Crucially, however, whilst the natural resource curse has of course caused an increase 
in violence and societal instability in the Niger Delta, research has concluded that other factors 
like corruption have also played a role (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji, & Yakubu, 2011, p. 41; Ibaba, 
2011). It is this problem which this author believes permeates so resolutely into the Niger Delta 
context. It can be seen as a central cause behind ongoing oilfield sabotage/theft by citizens,4 
why the 2009 amnesty programme has failed to stop these actions and why successive state 
development agencies have not provided widespread socio-economic development. Taken 
together, these issues will help highlight why the establishment of a Nigerian Non-Renewable 
Revenue Special Fund (NNRSF) is so important for the country. 
 
In order to validate this hypothesis and highlight the need for the NNRSF, the paper 
will now turn towards a more detailed study of the Niger Delta region, the site of the country’s 
main production facilities. The section will show why the amnesty programme has failed to 
prevent ongoing sabotage5 incidents from occurring due to the lack of widespread socio-
economic development, a situation that has occurred due to corruption within successive state 
development agencies. 
 
2. The Niger Delta: a paradox of black gold and poverty 
Life expectancy is falling in an age of blockbuster oil prices. Energy availability is 
poor in a region that provides one-fifth of the energy needs of the United States. The 
delta needs to import fuel despite producing over two million barrels of crude per day 
 
4 The people behind the sabotage come from a wide array of backgrounds and include unemployed youths and 
those from university campuses who formed armed groups as well as armed ethnic militias such as MEND 
(Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) (see Akinwumi, 2006; Agbola and Alabi, 2003; Asuni, 
2009a, 2009b; Mahler 2010). However, a large organised criminal element with international links also operates 
in the Niger Delta (see Ojakorotu, 2009; Wali, 2008, pp. 50-54; Watts, 2007). 
5 Data on the level of sabotage will be based on information provided by the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC), a subsidiary of Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN), the largest oil operator within the country 
(see Shell, 2014a, p. 2). While this will only provide a snapshot on the levels of sabotage/theft affecting other 
operating companies, it will still be able to highlight the seriousness of the problem. 
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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006, p. 9) 
 
The policies pursued by the federal government to bring stability to the long-running 
Niger Delta militancy have not achieved deep-rooted success. The use of military force to 
repress and crush the protests was a failure (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013, pp. 513–514; HRW, 1999; 
Ikelegbe, 2005, pp. 223–224; International Crisis Group [ICG], 2005; Ojakorotu & Gilbert, 
2010, pp. 5–6; Omotola, 2009a, pp. 138–140; Omeje, 2004) whilst the implementation of the 
phased state-sponsored Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme 
(see Obi, 2014, p. 249; Oluwaniyi, 2011) has had mixed results. Although 30,000 youths have 
been demobilised (Aghedo, 2015, p. 138) and several thousand weapons handed in through the 
programme (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 50) (the latter a partial success, given that Nigeria is home to 
an estimated 1 million small arms weapons in 2001) (Obuoforibo, n.d., p. 17), its success in 
bringing about widespread and long-term stability has left some academics sceptical (Aghedo, 
2012, 2015; Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011; Obi, 2014; Oluwaniyi, 
2011; Ushie, 2013). A mark of this can be seen in the number of post- 2009 oil field incidents 
reported in the Niger Delta.  
 
Statistics published by SPDC categorise their oilfield incidents into two major types: 
sabotage/theft and operational failures.6 Accordingly, Figure 1 shows that at least half (often 
far more) of the cases are due to sabotage/theft, though the data also show a fairly high number 
of incidents resulting from operational failures which raise concerns about SPDC Niger Delta 
operating standards in comparison to business production in other oil-producing countries (see 
Steiner, 2010). These incidents are seeing a huge volume of oil lost; Figure 2 shows that in 
2013 alone, 25,000 barrels were stolen from SPDC pipelines and facilities, though there has 
been a reduction in the past two years. Moreover, according to SPDC, “intentional third-party 
 
6 One must be cautious about these terminologies; under Nigerian law, oil REIs do not have to accept legal liability 
or pay out compensation or damages to local people, communities or the environment if oil spills have been found 
to be caused by third party involvement including sabotage. As a result, ‘[m]any operators have hidden under the 
cloak of sabotage to avoid remediation in cases of environmental spills accidents and discharges’ (Fraynas, 1998, 
p. 465. See also Adewale, 1989, pp. 93-96; Manby, 1999, p. 7) which has also seen accusations of deliberately 
underreporting the volume of oil spilt in each incident (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 16; Amnesty International 
and the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), 2012,  pp. 7-8; Amnesty 
International and Friends of the Earth International, 2011, p. 4; Etekpe and Okolo, 2010, p. 14; San, 2001, p. 11). 
A conflict of interest is also apparent as Nigerian regulatory bodies like the National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA) have no independent means to initiate oil spills investigations and instead rely on 
oil companies’ data and equipment (Amnesty International and CEHRD, 2012, p. 5; UNDP, 2006, p. 81). SPDC 
figures therefore should be viewed as indicators of a general yearly pattern or trend rather than as accurate 
statistics. 
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interferences with pipelines and infrastructure were responsible for around 75% of all oil spill 
incidents … over the last five years” (Shell, 2014b, p. 1). 
Figure 1: Number of oil spills/year (Shell, no date) 
 
Figure 2: Volume of oil spills/year (per barrel (bbl) (Shell, no date) 
 
 
What does this tell us about the DDR programme and the wider instability issues that 
remain in the Niger Delta? It is clear that these high levels of oilfield sabotage/theft in the post-
2009 period are partly fuelled by ongoing environmental devastation caused through oil and 
gas exploitation (see Figure 2 and Aghedo, 2015, p. 149; Gerner, Svensson, & Djumena, 2004, 
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p. 2; Ikelegbe, 2013; Nwilo & Badejo, 2006, p. 2; Obi, 1999; Olawoyin, Oyewole, & Grayson, 
2012; Omadjohwoefe, 2011, pp. 250–251; UNDP, 2006, p. 87) and the unresolved human 
development-related problems (Aghedo, 2015, p. 149; Ifeka, 2001, p. 99; Ikelegbe, 2013; 
National Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; Obi, 2014; Omoweh, 2001; UNDP, 2006, pp. 2, 137) which 
the DDR programme is not designed to tackle or resolve (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013, p. 518; Ushie, 
2013, p. 30).  
 
However, it is important to stress that other factors such as the increased risk of violence 
for resource rich and dependent countries (seen through the violent government response to 
Niger Delta protests (Omotola, 2009a, p. 141), the federal government’s control of natural 
resources7 (Ikelegbe, 2001, pp. 437–438; Ojione, 2010; Oyefusi, 2014; Uche & Uche, 2004) 
and the level of oil and gas revenue allocated to oil- and gas-producing states (Bain et al., 2015, 
p. 2; Dibua, 2005; ICG, 2006, pp. 12–13; Uche & Uche, 2004) through the derivation rule8 
(Aghedo, 2015, pp. 148–149) have directly contributed to these oil sabotage incidents. 
 
Yet, one could argue that the financial concerns remained tied up to the lack of 
development that the derivation fund provides to Niger Delta citizens which once again 
reinforces why the socio-economic situation plays such a key role in the creation of societal 
animosity, resentment and eventually violence towards the state and resource extraction 
industries (REI) operations. The impact of these unresolved issues would appear to be 
supported by research on why splinter militant groups began to violently sabotage the DDR 
programme in 2009–2010 (Okonofua, 2011, pp. 252–253). Ikoh and Ukpong (2013) found that 
militants abandoned the amnesty due to “respondents’ experience of failure in governments 
 
7 The Nigerian state’s effective control of oil resources in the Niger Delta occurs through a number of legal 
instrumentalities; Section 15 of Decree 51 of 1969, the Land Use Decree of 1978, Section 40 (3) of the 1979 
Constitution and the 1999 constitution (Odukoya, 2006, p. 254). The 1999 constitution sets out guidelines for the 
intergovernmental sharing of the major centrally collected revenues which under Section 44(3) includes the 
ownership and 'control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in[,] under or upon any land in Nigeria, or in, 
under or upon the territorial waters, and exclusive economic zone' (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999, 1999). 
8 The derivation rule refers to the level of revenue received from natural resources exclusively on a derivation or 
constituent unit-of-origin basis (Iledare and Suberu, 2010, p. 4) i.e. states receive allocations from the central pool 
of funding in strict proportion to their contribution (Akinola and Adesopo, 2011, p. 252). The money from natural 
resources is paid into a Federation Account which is allocated by the National Assembly based on the 
recommendations of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) (Iledare and Suberu, 
2010, p. 3). Derivation revenue is set aside before the remaining money is distributed in the (current) proportions 
(without special funds) of 52.68% to the federal government, 26.72% to the State governments and 20.60% to the 
local governments (Salami, 2011, p. 41). The derivation principle has had a ‘sharp decline from 100[%] in 1953 
to 10[%] in 1960, 45[%] in 1969, 20[%] in 1975, 1.5[%] in 1982, 1.0[%] in 1990, 3.0[%] in 1992 and the current 
13[%]’ (Akinoa and Adesopo 2011, p. 252) set out within the 1999 Nigerian constitution. 
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empowerment programme in the past” and because of successive government failures to 
genuinely tackle the root cause of political and economic exclusion (p. 155) through wealth 
redistribution, economic development and local resource control (Ojione, 2010; Oyefusi, 2014, 
p. 536; Ross, 2003, p. 13). The years of neglect have left communities feeling marginalised, 
cheated and left out from the benefits of oil revenues (Omadjohwoefe, 2011, p. 251) which has 
helped foster a siege mentality specifically among youths who continue to suffer 
unemployment (Aghedo, 2015, p. 149). They thus “feel … condemned to a future without hope 
and see conflict as a strategy to escape deprivation” (Oviasuyi & Uwadiae, 2010, p. 120; 
Oyefusi, 2014, pp. 537–538).  
 
Consequently, whilst it is impossible to extrapolate the number of sabotage/theft events 
that are due to an organised (often international) criminal element in the Niger Delta and those 
which are due to local gangs, militias or communities, one can project that an undisclosed 
number of attacks are due to the latter group (see Eweje, 2006a, p. 31; Turner & Brownhill, 
2004; Watts, 2001, p. 15; Zalik, 2004, p. 413). However, the creation of this situation is not 
because of any failure within the DDR programme but rather that other successive state agency 
mechanisms have failed to implement development due to corruption, and economic 
mismanagement,9 an issue that also extends into the Special Funds Account (SFA)10 and the 
various funds it invests into (Ikhariale, 2013; Okafor & Shittu, n.d.; Umoru & Erunke, 2013). 
 
Where does this leave the future of the Niger Delta? The ongoing mismanagement and 
corruption in development agencies and SFAs have led to decades of missed opportunities and 
 
9 On the 1960 Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) see England and Yakub, 2012, p. 536; Francis and 
Sardesai, 2008, p. 30; Frynas, 2001, p. 36); the 1973 Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA), 
the 1984 River Basin and Rural Development Authorities (RBRDAS) see Aghalino, 2009, p. 58; Akindele and 
Adebo; 2004; p. 59; Paki and Ebienfa, 2011, p. 137; Salua,1986, p. 327); and the 1992 Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) see Aghalino, 2009, p.59; Akinwale and Osbuohien, 2009, p.145; 
Frynas, 2001, pp.37-39; Ibaba, Ukaga, and Ukiwo, 2012, p. 13; Omotola, 2007; Omotola and Patrick, 2010, pp. 
121-127; Osha, 2006, p.2). The situation today under the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
established in 2000 has seen improvement. Authors have noted that despite its limited financial budget (see 
Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco, 2011, p. 74) it has performed better than all of its predecessors with a high number 
of projects completed by the agency (Higgins, 2009, p. 5; Olusakin, 2006, p. 19). Even so, the NDDC is not 
without its critics who see little progress made to improving the living conditions of either the Niger Delta people 
or the environment (Imobighe, 2004, p. 108). Moreover, as in previous incarnations of state agencies, the NDDC 
has been plagued by political bureaucracy and reports of corruption (Duruigbo, 2004-2005, p. 162; Omotola, 
2009b, p. 43) whilst projects and contractors are still selected via political patronage (Aigbokhan, 2008, pp. 241-
242; Ojakorotu, 2008, p. 107). 
10 Under constitutional law and before revenue is allocated to each Nigerian state from the Federation Account, 
the derivation principle includes 7% of special funds (known as the Special Funds Account (SFA) that are held 
and used by the Federal State from the FSA; the 0.72% Stabilisation Fund, 1.46% Derivation and Ecology Account 
and 3% Natural Resource Fund (Ekpo, 2004, p.25). 
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it is clear that providing genuine socio-economic development and economic opportunity to 
Niger Delta citizens is crucial if societal stability and a reduction in oilfield sabotage events 
are to occur. Moreover, government policies or agencies designed to bring about systematic 
development to the Niger Delta must be safeguarded from this problem which explains why 
simply increasing the level of derivation money allocated to Niger Delta states or the 
implementation of yet another new development agency does not guarantee success. Instead, 
the NNRSF policy offers a bold but logical step forward through which to achieve meaningful 
socio-economic development in order to help bring down the high levels of oilfield sabotage. 
The next section will set out this policy in detail through a focus on its leadership and level of 
funding whilst also examining the political conditions for its establishment, an important factor, 
given the entrenched issue of corruption. 
 
3. From theoretical solutions to practical implementation; breaking 
the cycle of corruption and sabotage   
‘The level of pillage and plundering of public resources is not limited to oil communities; it is 
emblematic of the corruption pervading Nigeria’s larger society’ (Akinola, 2008, p. 93 
emphasis added). 
The problems in the Niger Delta have seen numerous strategies put forward that aim to 
successfully harness oil wealth in order to provide socio-economic development. These ideas 
include the concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR), an ethical and moral framework 
that seeks greater involvement of REIs solving social and environmental problems (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; Rama, Milano, Salas, & Liu, 2009; Zyglidopoulos, 2002), and stakeholder 
relations management (SRM), where corporations are confronted with economic, social and 
environmental stakeholder claims from Niger Delta communities and the federal government 
that they then resolve on their behalf (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Hillman & Keim, 2001). 
Academics have also proposed direct state distribution of mineral revenue to citizens rather 
than government agencies such as the NDDC (Moss, 2010; Palley, 2003, p. 10; Sala-i-Martin 
& Subramanian, 2003, p. 17; Shaxson, 2007, p. 1135). 
 
However, whilst CSR and SRMs’ underlying intentions deserve some praise for 
achieving a measure of success in Nigeria and other countries (Eweje, 2006b; Ite, 2007; Sachs, 
Post, & Preston, 2002), other academics remain critical of these policies (see Boele, Fabig, & 
Wheeler, 2001; Frynas, 2005). CSR has also been seen by some as little more than public 
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relations exercise (Christian Aid, 2004; Friedman, 1970; Valor, 2005, p. 200) whose impact in 
Nigeria has helped create and sustain intercommunity violence and the militant revolt through 
the favouring of some oil host communities over others (Akpan, 2006, pp. 234–35; Frynas, 
2005, pp. 589–591; Ite, 2004, p. 7; Tuodolo, 2009, pp. 537–538). These small-scale, localised 
and often highly contentious development projects have a micro-level impact (Christian Aid, 
2004, p. 24; Quak, 2008) which cannot achieve the large-scale socio-economic development 
necessary in the Niger Delta to help reduce oil field sabotage. Direct state revenue distribution 
is also problematic. Despite this approach helping circumvent state corruption, it would prevent 
the Nigerian Government from investing in the necessary socio-economic development for the 
Niger Delta (and wider country) and thus would do little to stem the high levels of Niger Delta 
oil field sabotage and instability. It is also difficult to believe that Nigeria would be able to 
manage this mechanism in a transparent manner in the face of entrenched institutional 
instability and inherent corruption (Ross, 2007, p. 243; Weinthal & Luong, 2006, p. 42).  
 
How then can a policy be designed that suppresses corruption whilst at the same time 
securing the Niger Delta socio-economic development? Given the above points, this author 
proposes the creation of a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund (NNRSF). The 
NNRSF is designed to counter the embezzlement of state funds and achieve sustained socio-
economic development in the Niger Delta. In essence, the NNRSF would have a separate trust 
fund managed in partnership with the UNDP that would be funded through a petroleum excess 
revenue formula. Whilst the scheme presents real challenges, they are not insurmountable and 
several possible steps can be taken which would help create a climate that would be more 
conducive to the scheme. 
  
3.1 Leadership of the NNRSF       
Internationally, there are numerous examples from emerging market and developing 
economies (EMaDEs) that have undergone constitutional and legal changes regarding the 
location and mechanism that hold natural resource revenue. One of the most common systems 
is the creation of a non-renewable fund (NWF), which is part of the broader Sovereign Wealth 
Fund system.11 “A trust is an arrangement in law in which legal ownership of an asset, the res, 
is transferred to a trustee who becomes responsible for managing the res for the benefit of 
another person or persons, the beneficiaries” (Duruigbo, 2004, p. 168). In terms of oil trust 
 
11 See Truman (2007, p. 10) for a comprehensive list. 
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funds, this would see the revenue, or part of it, derived from oil exploration and production 
constituting the asset (i.e. the agreed excess revenue level) which the board of trustees would 
be empowered to manage for the benefit of the population (Duruigbo, 2004, p. 169). In Norway, 
for example, all government revenue from the petroleum sector is channelled directly into the 
Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) to isolate government spending away from this 
revenue and save the oil wealth for future generations (Norges Bank, n.d.; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation & Development [OECD], 2009, p. 50). Meanwhile, on the advice of 
the IMF, Venezuela has included the establishment of article 321 in the 1999 Constitution 
which created the Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilisation (FIEM) to help insulate 
the budget and the economy from fluctuations in oil prices (Fasano, 2000, p. 9) and invest in 
economic diversification (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute [SWFI], n.d.-a). Similarly, The Oil 
Revenue Stabilisation Fund of Mexico (FEIP) was legally launched in 2000 in order to lessen 
the effects on the nation’s finances when there are declines in oil revenue and act as a 
stabilisation fund (SWFI, n.d.-b). 
 
Whilst these NWF examples highlight different objectives, many utilise similar 
methods; both Mexico’s FEIP and Venezuela’s FIEM are financed through oil revenue that 
exceed annually set average benchmark prices (Bjerkholt & Niculescu, 2004, p. 175; OECD, 
2009, pp. 53–55). In Venezuela, despite frequent changes to the FIEM by former President 
Hugo Chavez (Bacon & Tordo, 2006, p. 113; Manzaono & Scrofina, n.d., p. 10), revenue 
benchmarks since 2008 are calculated for government fiscal revenues based upon five-year 
moving averages (Clemente, Faris, & Puente, 2002, p. 20). In Mexico’s case, the FEIP gains 
cash inflow from a special levy on oil revenues (Jimenez & Tromben, 2006, p. 73) set at 25% 
since 2003 (Revenue Watch Institute, n.d.) which the government has set at $76.40 per barrel 
in its 2015 forecast (Montes, 2014).  
  
However, although the NRFs in Mexico, Venezuela and elsewhere have contributed to 
enhancing the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making budget expenditure less driven by 
revenue availability (Fasano, 2000, p. 20), the results have been mixed. Authors (Davis, 
Ossowski, Daniel, & Barnett, 2001, p. 27; Weinthal & Luong, 2006, p. 40) have queried 
whether these NRFs are an entirely appropriate solution to the fiscal and policy problems faced 
by countries such as Nigeria. Indeed, as DeVries (2002, p. 33) summarises, NRFs are only part 
of the solution which also require robust fiscal rules and strong political commitment, both of 
which contemporary Nigeria cannot readily rely upon. This is crucial because the running of 
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the Mexican and Venezuelan NRFs is via the national government12 and as such, Nigeria’s 
political institutions are perhaps not best placed to lead the NNRSF scheme, especially in the 
light of the NDDC and SFA corruption problems. 
 
Consequently, where NNRSF policy differs to these other examples is through the 
involvement of an exterior outside agency which would run the trust fund in partnership with 
the Nigerian Government. This would help avert unrestrained public spending in oil booms 
that lead to macroeconomic instability in the country (Eifert, Gelb, & Tallroth, 2003, p. 8), 
prevent the deviation of the NRF from its original course (a problem for certain other NRFs 
which could be the case for Nigeria (Fasano, 2000, p. 20) and make sure that the fiscal capital 
is utilised to implement the necessary Niger Delta socio-economic development. Moreover, 
such an arrangement acknowledges that direct autonomous control of oil revenue funds for 
development through a government-controlled NRF would, in all probability, continue to 
suffer the same levels of corruption and embezzlement problems outlined in this paper. The 
movement of the oil revenue money into a trust fund managed by an international partner helps 
nullify this issue. For Nigeria, the precedent for its own NNRSF has in many ways already 
occurred. Nigeria’s SFAs (see Note 8) are funded through the central Federation Account so a 
similar set-up could apply for the NNRSF which would prevent the necessity of constitutionally 
amending Article 162(1) or removing revenue from outside the Federation Account system.13 
Indeed, such a move is not overly radical as the precedent for state constitutional changes has 
been seen in other EMaDEs many times before; Dressen summarises that in the 1990s alone, 
“roughly 70 emerging democracies have completely rewritten or substantially altered their 
constitutions” (Dressel, 2005, p. 1). 
  
The UNDP represents an obvious choice to run the NNRSF due to its widespread 
development and financial experience. The UNDP currently runs over 3,100 development 
projects in 177 countries and territories and has worked in a number of high-profile and 
successful (EMaDE) government development partnerships (Government of Rwanda and UN, 
 
12 The FEIP is run through a Technical Committee formed by officers of the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) 
(International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (no date) whilst FIEM is regulated by the Board of the Central 
Bank of Venezuela (BCV) (Sovereign Wealth Fun Institute, no date a). 
13 Article 162(1) of Nigeria’s 1999 constitution, categorically states that all revenues collected by the Federation 
shall be collected and placed ‘into the Federation Account’ except for a number of listed caveats (Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). These listed caveats include 'the personal income tax of the personnel of 
the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force, the Ministry or department of government charged 
with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja’ (Article 162(1) 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
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n.d., p. 25; UNDP, n.d.-a). Meanwhile, their array of international Funds and Joint Programmes 
that run through their Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office and alongside their “National 
Fund” approach offer clear parallels to the NNRSF scheme (UNDP, n.d.-b). In Ecuador, the 
(now defunct) Yasuni ITT scheme funds were administered by the UNDP MPTF Office. The 
steering committee included three government representatives, one civil society representative, 
two contributor representatives (chosen from nations that contribute to the scheme) and one 
technical secretary with no vote (Martin, 2011, p. 69). Originally using majority voting, the 
scheme ran with consensus voting if there is no majority vote, whilst the Ecuadorian 
Government reserved the right to make all final trust fund decisions (Martin, 2011, p. 70).  
 
The NNRSF could utilise a similar steering committee composition that takes into 
account the context of the Nigerian Federal political system and the development aims and 
objectives. Six federal governmental representatives could be chosen alongside six state-level 
representatives with the latter rotated on a pre-determined bi-annual basis so that over a 6-year 
period, all 36 Nigerian states would have had direct involvement in the NNRSF.14 Again, due 
to the danger of corruption, they would not form the majority of the steering committee but 
would instead be joined by 15 representatives from the UNDP MPTF office to ensure that 
transparency and financial accountability are maintained. Two further positions should be 
given to members of Nigerian civil society in a bi-annual process through either elections 
(which does run the risk of fraud) or their award to different ethnic group leaders on a rotational 
basis. These members would not only help oversee the work of the NNRSF but also provide a 
direct link with Nigerian society which becomes part of this central decision- making 
mechanism. Lastly, a technical secretary position with no vote would have the final position.  
 
As in the original format for the Yasuni ITT scheme, the NNRSF steering committee 
would utilise majority voting which would act as a final accountability check on how the 
funding is spent and the development undertaken. To aid the steering committee in this regard, 
the NNRSF could also operate formal community meetings in the region (similar in scope and 
scale to the recent UNEP fieldwork mission to Ogoniland, Niger Delta which saw the 
assembled team conduct 264 formal community meetings attended by over 23,000 people 
(UNEP, 2011b, p. 2) so that constructive dialogue is occurring between the trust fund and local 
 
14 In order to ensure fair representation, one of the six Federal governmental representative should be for the 
Federal Capital Territory Region around Abuja. 
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people about development priorities in the local area. Where possible, development project 
contracts could be awarded to local Niger Delta builders and other tradesmen, whilst revenue 
could also be set aside to train and find employment for young people, a key priority, given the 
ongoing youth unemployment and underemployment. 
 
3.2 Funding of the NNRSF 
The second key NNRSF consideration is the level of funding. The implementation of a more 
stringent Norway GPFG might appear to be more suitable than the FEIP or FIEM, but as has 
already been noted, Nigeria’s strong reliance on oil revenue makes this impossible. Therefore, 
the NNRSF steering committee could utilise an excess revenue system similar to Venezuela’s 
FIEM and Mexico’s FEIP created from all derivable and accruable petroleum income15 and 
based on yearly estimates for petroleum prices that take into account short-term market 
volatility.  
 
Though the OECD has criticised Mexico’s FEIP for the limited accumulation of savings 
due to excess revenue allocation rules and a capped revenue fund (OECD, 2009, pp. 51–52), it 
is unlikely that Nigeria would agree to a NNRSF that had a funding level anywhere near so 
high. Instead, a smaller excess revenue level of between 15% and 20% of yearly petroleum 
prices would stand a greater chance of acceptance which although lower, would still provide a 
sizeable level of revenue from which to work with. For example, 2014 figures for Nigerian oil 
production in the second quarter averaged 1.91 million bbl/d (second quarter) (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2014b, p. 26) which when multiplied to the world oil price in November 2014 of 
US$76 would provide government revenue of US$105 million. A NNRSF excess revenue 
scheme set at a 15% funding would receive US$15,750,000, whilst an excess revenue scheme 
set at 20% excess revenue would generate US$21,000,000.  
 
These figures highlight the significant cash revenue that could be generated with a 
lower set excess revenue formula that would still enable the NNRSF to be able to implement 
widespread socioeconomic development. It must be noted that the volatility of oil prices means 
that such levels of funding for the NRRSF cannot always be guaranteed. However, were other 
federal government development and investment schemes abolished and amalgamated into the 
 
15 This would include all revenue derivable to the Federal and State government as set out under the Constitution, 
Article 161(1), which in turn encompasses all revenue from downstream and export operations, taxes, royalties, 
rents, signature bonuses, fees etc. 
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NNRSF (e.g. the NDDC, SFAs and others16), a policy undertaken in Chile,17 this would not 
only help “kick start” the NNRSF financially but shore up the fund when oil prices fall. 
 
So far, these sections have been able to show the worthwhile role that the NNSRF can 
play in countering the problem of corruption and implementing socio-economic development 
in order to help reduce the level of oilfield sabotage and instability in the Niger Delta. This last 
section of the paper assesses the viability of its implementation by investigating the wider 
political economy of Nigeria and gauging where the possible political conditions for its 
emergence may stem from. This is important, given the difficulties that previous political 
administrations have faced in reforming the petroleum industry, an indicator of which can be 
seen in the failure to pass the petroleum industry bill (PIB) (see Okoye, 2012; Pérouse de 
Montclos, 2014) and the radical changes implemented by President Buhari in relation to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) (Gupte, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
As has been shown, one of the biggest challenges for the country is its battle against 
corruption. This paper believes that it is through the government’s effort at combating 
corruption via the reforming of various laws, anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary where 
the right conditions for the discussion and possible implementation of the NNRSF can emerge. 
 
3.3 Implementation of the NNSRF  
It is important to note that the issue of corruption has not been ignored by Nigerian 
Governments which have sought to combat this problem through various legal laws and 
commissions.18 Most recently, under former President Obasanjo, anti-corruption mechanisms 
have assumed two key forms: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
 
16 These include the Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF) and the Petroleum Technology Development Fund 
(PTDF). The PEF was established as a parastatal of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources by Decree No.9 of 1975 
(amended by Decree No.32 of 1989) to administer uniform petroleum product prices throughout the country. It is 
funded through the net surplus revenue recovered from Oil Marketing companies (Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
(Management) Board, no date). The PTDF was established under Act No 25 in 1973 as a fund for the purpose of 
training and education of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry (Petroleum Technology Development Fund, no 
date). This was funded through the outstanding monetary assets in the former Gulf Oil Company Fund and money 
freely donated by individuals or accruing to the government (ibid). 
17 Chile's Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund (ESSF) was established in 2007 under the passage of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. Its initial contribution of $2.58 billion was mostly derived from Chile's old Copper 
Stabilisation Fund (totalling $2.56 billion) established in 1985 that the ESSF replaced (Chile Ministry of Finance, 
no date). 
18 This includes ‘[t]he Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign, the Code 
of Conduct Bureau of 1990, Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Decree of 1995, Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission’ (Umoh and Ubom, 2012, p. 102. See also Sowunmi, Adesola, and Salako, 2010, pp. 1055-
1056) and the Money Laundering Act 2011 (Odusote, 2013, pp. 130-131). 
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Commission (IPIC) established through the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 
in June 2000 and the EFCC through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
Establishment Act of 2004.  
 
The IPIC is an independent body that has extensive administrative duties and is tasked 
with investigating, arresting and prosecuting people for corruption (which also extends to non-
Nigerian agents in foreign states) and enacting corrective, preventive and educational duties 
(Abdulrasheed, Babaita, & Yinusa, 2012, p. 21; Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Commission, 2000; Ocheje, 2001; Odusote, 2013; Olagoke, 2004). 19 
Offences committed under the Act (mostly surrounding economic corruption carried out 
through business but also in relation to political corruption (Olagoke, 2004, p. 77) are 
prosecuted in the Federal High Court and State High Court (Odusote, 2013, p. 129), with 
sentences carrying a maximum weight of up to seven years or the option of a fine 
(Odusote, 2013, p. 129; Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission, 
2011).  
 
The IPIC and wider Act have been given positive evaluations by some scholars (Ocheje, 
2001, p. 184; Olagoke, 2004) and achieved some successes (see Musari, 2015). However, 
concerns have been raised over some of the Acts’ financial deterrence aspects (Olagoke, 2004, 
p. 86) and lack of severe punishment for those convicted (Odusote, 2013, p. 129). More 
worryingly, despite over 300 cases being pursued by the IPIC (Independent Corrupt Practices 
& Other Related Offences Commission, 2015, pp. 1–21), very few cases lead to convictions.20 
This is partly attributable to the politicisation of cases and the failure of the court system to 
ensure that individuals are successfully prosecuted and convicted where appropriate 
(Enweremadu, 2006; Odusote, 2013, p. 125).  
 
The second key anti-corruption mechanism is the EFCC. This is charged with 
investigating, prosecuting and penalising economic and financial crimes and enforcing the 
various laws dealing with these matters (Sowunmi et al., 2010, p. 1056). The EFCC has seen 
 
19 The IPIC is ‘composed of a chairperson and twelve other members, including a retired police officer, not below 
the rank of Commissioner of Police, a legal practitioner with at least ten years post-call experience, a retired judge 
of a superior court of record, a retired public servant not below the rank of director, a woman, a chartered 
accountant, and a young person, not less than 21 or more than 30 years of age (section 3(3)(a)-(f))’ (Ocheje, 2001,  
pp. 177-178). 
20 ‘For example, between May 2001 and July 2005, ICPC filed 49 cases involving 104 individuals but was able 
to conclude just one’ (Ogungbamila, 2014, p. 145). 
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some notable achievements (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011, pp. 194–198; HRW, 2011; Obua, 
2010, pp. 44–45; Ribadu, 2006; Sowunmi et al., 2010) but again has been critiqued over the 
lack of prosecutions against corrupt political figures and the little progress made on court cases 
(HRW, 2011, p. 1; Inokoba & Ibegu, 2011, pp. 288– 289; Obua, 2010, pp. 45–46). This issue 
has been exacerbated by the constitutionally enshrined immunity laws (Section 308(1) for the 
president, vice-president and the 36 state governors and their deputies (Umoh & Ubom, 2012, 
p. 103) (totalling 76 senior government officials) (Hatchard, 2014, p. 83) who thus remain 
beyond the reach of the law (Tajudeem, 2013, p. 195). The EFCC has also been criticised for 
its use as a political instrument against government opponents (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011, p. 
198; Hazen & Horner, 2007, p. 12; Inokoba & Ibegu, 2011, p. 289; Lawson, 2009, p. 86; 
Sowunmi et al., 2010) which has “effectively aborted” (Suberu, 2009, p. 264) or at least 
severely weakened the legitimacy of its work.  
 
Given these issues, how viable is the NNRSF and where would it emerge from? In 
answer to these interlinked questions, this paper believes that the NNRSF can be implemented 
after initial steps are taken that strengthen the fight against corruption. It is through these steps 
that a political environment will emerge that will offer the right conditions for the NNRSF 
policy to be announced, discussed and it is hoped to be accepted. 
 
The first step is the removal of the political immunity clauses from the constitution. 
This could occur through its transference into legislation in order to bring it in line with judicial 
and legislative immunity laws, thus making it easier to amend or remove the clause (Okeke & 
Okeke, 2015, p. 120). One way might possibly be through an amendment to Item 47, 2nd 
Schedule, of the 1999 Constitution which grants the National Assembly the power to make law 
on privileges and immunities of its members, and consequently could be enlarged to include 
the immunities of the President, Vice- President, Governors and Deputy-Governors (Arishe, 
2010, pp. 283, 306). This reform is supported by academic (Aka, 2006, p. 475; Arishe, 2010; 
Umoh & Ubom, 2012), non-governmental (Socio- Economic Rights & Accountability Project, 
n.d.), political (Kayode-Adedeji, 2015; The Nigerian Voice, 2013, 2014) and public and civil 
society groups (Ehirim, 2013; Mohammed, 2015), highlighting that a groundswell of support 
for this policy does exist in Nigeria. However, as efforts at overturning this constitutional right 
have failed in the past (Aziken et al., 2015), it is clear that the support of the Nigerian president 
is crucial to this endeavour. The incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari, who fought his 
Presidential campaign on an anti-corruption platform (see Akinloye, 2015), has indicated that 
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he would remove the immunity clause from the constitution (HRW, 2015) so it is hoped that 
this will occur in the near future. 
 
Secondly, efforts should be made to condense the wide, often overlapping sets of 
corruption laws into one piece of legislation and also reform the apparent “duplicity of effort” 
surrounding the two anti-corruption agencies work (Odusote, 2013, p. 132). A single piece of 
corruption legislation would prevent narrow interpretations of the various corruption laws by 
defence counsels or the judicial system which help defendants escape justice (Odusote, 2013, 
p. 132). Penalties for corruption offences should be raised and such measures could be inserted 
into the new bill (though this paper does not agree with authors who suggest the use of the 
death penalty for maximum sentences (Adegbulu, 2010; Odusote, 2013, p. 129).  
 
Reform of the two corruption agencies is also imperative in order to improve the 
effectiveness of their work. Either each agency should be given a clearly defined corruption 
jurisdiction (e.g. the EFCC concentrates on political, administrative/professional and societal 
corruption, whilst the IPIC examines economic/commercial and organised crime corruption 
(Adegbulu, 2010, p. 12) or one of them should be abolished and their work amalgamated into 
the other. This author, like Odusote (2013, p. 140), believes that the establishment of a single 
corruption agency independent of the federal government is the best solution for the country 
which indicates that the IPIC should become the country’s national corruption agency, given 
the additional need to amend the EFCC bill to prevent ongoing government interference 
(Sowunmi et al., 2010, p. 1066). Their work would be aided through wider judiciary system 
reform, something that academics feel is vital if the agency(ies) are able to achieve better results 
(Enweremadu, 2006; Odusote, 2013). 
 
This second step is no less difficult than the first and would require political support 
from the president to have any hope of success. Again President Buhari has recently signalled 
his interest in overhauling both of these agencies (Etuk, 2015) and the judicial system (P.M. 
News, 2015) via the creation of an anti-corruption advisory committee (BBC News, 2015) and 
it is hoped that whatever reforms do transpire go far enough in strengthening agency and 
judicial work. 
 
Once these steps occur, the corruption agency(ies) will be in a stronger position from 
which to oversee and prosecute corruption cases (especially against Nigerian politician’s) and 
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by doing so help gradually move the political apparatus away from entrenched corruption 
towards an environment that would be conducive for the proposition of the NNRSF. At this 
point, the newly empowered corruption agency(ies) would undoubtedly welcome efforts to 
improve government fiscal accountability and thus would have a significant role in promoting 
the NNRSF policy. In order to gain crossparty support for the NNRSF in the Senate and House 
of Representatives and the necessary statutory law and constitutional changes, agreement could 
be reached with the UNDP to widen the scheme and accommodate socio-economic 
development projects in other non-Niger Delta states over a set period of time. This would help 
alleviate potential concerns of regional favouritism and allow other areas of Nigeria to benefit 
from socio-economic development.  
 
Overall, one must view these as long-term transitional steps which will be difficult to 
achieve and do not guarantee success, given the current political economy of Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the seeds for these changes have already been sown through the establishment of 
the EFCC and IPIC, the previous (albeit failed) efforts at constitutionally amending Nigerian 
political immunity and the election of a president on an anti-corruption platform. Indeed, the 
election of Buhari raises real prospects for the necessary reforms to occur as the president’s 
support is vital. “Attempts to eliminate corruption tend to succeed when reforms … are 
supported at the highest levels of government” (Mauro, 1998, p. 13). Whilst only time will 
show whether this anti-corruption rhetoric turns into reality, were this to happen, there is every 
reason to believe that the NNRSF could be launched and seriously debated in Nigerian political 
circles. 
 
4. Conclusion: why a Nigerian NNRSF is a positive step forward 
 ‘Constitutional reform...has become a popular method for countries to account for past 
institutional failures, reconstruct political structures  after authoritarian rule, and ensure better 
governance in the future’ (Dressel, 2005, p. 1) 
The human and environmental situation in the Niger Delta cannot and should not continue. 
Nigeria should be a flourishing African and international economic power, one which ought to 
have given its citizens improved social and economic living conditions. Instead, as this paper 
has revealed, the disparity between the Niger Delta’s oil wealth on the one hand and the 
chronically poor socioeconomic and environmental conditions for its citizens on the other has 
helped ferment anger and resentment by citizens who feel woefully betrayed by the state. This 
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article believes that local people are driven to violence and ongoing oilfield sabotage by a sense 
of injustice over not only what they see as “their oil” but also by state development agencies 
that have consistently let them down. The natural resource curse is most starkly seen through 
the huge levels of corruption that have hampered these agencies and represents an ongoing 
challenge for the work of the EFCC and IPIC who have taken positive steps forward but remain 
overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the problem and weaknesses in their regulatory frameworks.  
 
Two points follow on from this. Firstly, it is clear that any policy designed to implement 
socioeconomic development would need to acknowledge that the impact of corruption will 
remain a factor in the short to medium term. The NNRSF has sought to do this by creating a 
policy that accommodates Nigeria’s wider political economy and the influence of corruption 
directly into the scheme. Secondly, the policy can only be borne out of efforts to tackle 
corruption and reform the various national agencies, judicial system and laws. By doing so, it 
may be possible to create an environment that would be more conducive to the idea of the 
NNRSF. Whilst this is not guaranteed, it stands the greatest chance of success with an 
administration like President Buhari’s that is keen on pursuing the campaign against corruption. 
 
Thus, the NNRF should be seen as a long-term strategy that will only bear fruit after 
many years of planning, consultation, political commitment and labour, the achievement of 
which will help reduce the levels of sabotage in the Niger Delta and provide employment for 
young people hungry to improve their lives. The scheme can be seen as only the first step on 
the road to wider Nigerian social and economic development and could and should be repeated 
in other areas of the country that are also in desperate need of socio-economic advancement 
and support. As a result, this article believes that the NNRF should steer Nigeria’s social and 
environmental development for at least several decades in order to ensure that the country’s 
fiscal petroleum income is utilised for the benefit of the many and not for the few. 
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